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Background: Over decades American society has become 
increasingly fragmented, distrusting, and unequal. Distrust and 
inequality interact with institutions performing improperly to 
weaken the society.  
 
Purpose: To suggest ways to strengthen evaluation’s role in a 
changing society  
 
Setting: Evaluation has entered a post normal phase where 
evaluations are losing credibility and effectiveness.  
 
Intervention: Analyze the changing society and suggest 
adjustments that evaluators might make.  
 
Research design: Collate and synthesize empirical studies 
about society and the implications for evaluators. 
 
Data collection and analysis: Collect and interpret seminal 
empirical economic, sociological, and political studies of 
beliefs and inequality in the United States.  
 
Findings: To strengthen the potency of evaluations of any type, 
evaluators could act as moral fiduciaries, practice 
transparency, cultivate cognitive empathy, focus on deep 
stories and deep values, and mitigate inequalities in the 
evaluation space. They can act as critics of evaluation 
practices inside and outside the evaluation space. They should 
avoid technical, social, and situational biases, including 
racism, sexism, and conflicts of interest, to increase the honesty 
and credibility of evaluations. They should not allow career 
concerns to prevent them from doing the right thing. These 
professional ethics and practices can be applied singly or 
collectively to most evaluation approaches to strengthen the 
evaluator’s role and address major societal problems. 
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Over the past several decades, American 
society has become fragmented, polarized, and 
driven by distrust, severe inequality, and 
institutional corruption. The evaluation 
approach I’ve advocated, deliberative 
democratic evaluation based on inclusion, 
discussion, and deliberation, doesn’t seem 
potent enough. To strengthen evaluations in 
general, I propose that evaluators should act 
as moral fiduciaries, practice transparency, 
cultivate cognitive empathy, focus on deep 
stories and deep values, and control technical 
and social biases, like racism and sexism. We 
should strive to enhance the honesty, fairness, 
and impartiality of evaluations and address 
the emerging problems of society. 
I was led to this reconsideration by 
Trump’s election. What surprised me most 
was that my relatives in my hometown had 
become Trump supporters. My family had 
been Roosevelt Democrats coming out of the 
Great Depression. Most worked in a huge 
munitions plant and nearby heavy industries. 
When I left the area in 1964, they were still 
avid Democrats. I’ve tried to figure out what 
happened, which led me to reassess the 
evaluator’s role in a changing society. 
 
Consensus to Fragmentation 
 
Over the past seventy years, American society 
has changed dramatically. When I was young, 
say about 1960, there was a consensus among 
the majority that the government was good 
and society was on the right track. This 
consensus emerged from World War II and 
Roosevelt’s New Deal (Kennedy, 1999). There 
was a palpable sense of unity and national 
purpose. Of course, minorities who had been 
seriously exploited never held such benign 
views. 
 During the 1960s the majority consensus 
and trust in government began breaking 
down. There was the Vietnam War, during 
which government officials deceived the 
public, wasted hundreds of thousands of lives 
and billions of dollars. There was the Civil 
Rights movement, in which activists 
attempted to rectify long-standing injustices. 
Majority opinion split on Vietnam and civil 
rights. The 1970s brought Nixon and 
Watergate, more disagreement, discord, 
distrust of government. 
 By 1980 Reagan could run on the slogan, 
“The government is not the solution to the 
problem; the government is the problem.” He 
ushered in an era of privatization, 
deregulation, and anti-government sentiment. 
In 1996 Clinton said, “The era of big 
government is over.” He deregulated the 
banks. The 21st century brought the 
contested Bush/Gore election, the trauma of 
9/11, the Afghan and Iraq wars, and the Great 
Financial Crisis that put the financial system 
in jeopardy. Distrust deepened. American 
society fragmented. 
 
Distrust, Inequality, and Corruption 
 
During these decades, three powerful trends 
emerged: a deep decline in trust, a sharp spike 
in inequality, and a marked increase in 
corruption. People did not trust the 
government, they did not trust their 
institutions, and they did not trust each other. 
Decline in trust was precipitous during 
Vietnam and Watergate when trust in 
government dropped from 77% in 1964 to 30% 
by 1980 (Rothstein, 2018). By 2014 trust in 
government was 20%. Trust in Congress was 
6%. Not all countries are like this. Trust in 
government in the Nordic countries is 70%. 
 Another powerful trend has been 
steepening inequality, which began in the 
1970s when the economic rules were 
rewritten. In 1981 Reagan dropped the tax rate 
on the wealthy dramatically. America now has 
the most extreme inequality of income and 
wealth of any developed country (Piketty, 
2014; Saez & Zucman, 2019; Stiglitz, 2018). 
The three richest Americans own more than 
the bottom 160 million. The richest .1 percent 
have as much wealth as the lower 90 percent 
(Hacker and Pierson, 2020). CEOs of major 
corporations, who used to make 20 times the 
average worker wage, now make 360 times as 
much. The CEO of Disney makes 1424 times 
the average wage of Disney workers (Dubchuk 
& Fried, 2004). Wages have stagnated for 
decades. Social mobility has declined below 
that in many countries.  
 Those who control the money take huge 
slices off the top. When the head of the Citadel 
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hedge fund reached a stalemate in divorce 
negotiations with his second wife, she revealed 
he was making 100 hundred million dollars 
per month. He settled with her in two days. 
Top hedge fund CEOs make a billion dollars a 
year personally. They pay 15% tax, if any (Saez 
& Zucman, 2019). Nobel economist Joseph 
Stiglitz (2018) said the economy is rigged in 
favor of the wealthy. Conservative media 
mogul Rupert Murdoch noted America is 
developing permanent social classes. 
 A third trend has been worsening 
corruption. When Governor Blagojevich of 
Illinois moved to fill the Senate seat vacated by 
Obama, few expected him to auction the seat 
to the highest bidder for personal gain. 
Patronage had become corruption. American 
society was beset with cronyism, favoritism, 
and conflicts of interest. Special interests 
dominated legislatures to secure favors. 
Political scientists call such behavior 
institutional corruption (Lessig, 2018). About 
75% of Americans believe corruption is 
widespread throughout the government 
(Rothstein 2018, Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). 
 Distrust, inequality, and corruption 
interact in downward spirals. The more a 
government is distrusted, the less it can 
remedy corruption or inequality, and the more 
it becomes vulnerable to cronyism and 
conflicts of interest. Distrust allows corruption 
that generates more distrust and inequality. 
These trends are reflected in polarized politics, 
dystopian novels, and apocalyptic films. How 
should evaluators behave in such a society? 
 
Post Normal Evaluation 
 
Normally, evaluators conduct studies based 
on accepted criteria and methods. But how 
can we agree amidst severe fragmentation? 
The forces affecting society affect evaluation. 
Evaluators operate inside society, not outside. 
Evaluator Tom Schwandt (2019) contends that 
the field of evaluation has entered a “post 
normal” phase, based on a distinction between 
normal and post normal science. 
 In normal science, researchers conduct 
studies accepted by government and citizens. 
In post normal science, the findings are called 
into question. Environmental science is an 
example. Distrust of government and 
institutions spreads to science. According to 
Schwandt, the same is happening with 
evaluation. In post normal evaluation, a 
positive reception for studies cannot be 
assumed. Findings may be contested, and the 
legitimacy of the study disputed. 
 I would add that evaluation has also been 
changed directly by privatization and 
deregulation. At one time universities 
conducted evaluations of pharmaceutical 
drugs, but Clinton allowed companies to 
control the evaluation of their own drugs. This 
resulted in strong biases in drug evaluations, 
biases favoring positive findings for company 
drugs (House, 2011). Evaluation studies have 
lost credibility in part because evaluation 
changed. Nielsen, Lemire, and Christie (2018) 
found that single purchasers of evaluations, 
usually governments, contract with firms they 
trust to conduct studies in a reliable manner. 
Over time these agencies and a few firms 
develop close ties that shape studies in certain 
ways (House, 1997). 
 What should evaluators do? One of John 
Maynard Keynes insights is that nations can 
choose the kind of society they want to be 
(Carter, 2020). Some choices lie beyond 
evaluators, but evaluators can effect positive 
changes within their domain. And perhaps 
their influence can be extended. 
 
Develop a Perspective Based on 
Empirical Evidence and Moral 
Sensibility 
 
In the midst of fragmentation, it’s important to 
have an idea of what’s happening in the larger 
society. Otherwise, evaluators are buffeted 
about by claims and counter-claims. A careful 
understanding of where society is and what 
evaluators might do provides a sense of 
direction and enables them to be proactive 
rather than reactive. 
 It’s essential to base this understanding on 
empirical evidence and moral responsibility. 
An informed view is based on empirical 
evidence. A moral view is concerned about the 
welfare of others. There are unbiased empirical 
studies of inequality by economists, of political 
behavior by political scientists, of beliefs and 
communities by sociologists and 
anthropologists, and of events and institutions 
by historians and journalists. Might these be 
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wrong? Certainly, but if the findings prove 
incorrect, they can be corrected based on 
empirical evidence. Sound research is 
responsive to empirical evidence. 
 By contrast, many analyses are ideological 
and ill-founded. Privately owned media 
advance views acceptable to sponsors. Fox 
News is an example, as are the Koch influence 
networks (Mayer, 2016; McLean, 2017). 
Powerful groups sponsor biased studies to 
support their interests, conducted by 
organizations like the American Enterprise 
Institute and Heritage Foundation. Ideological 
researchers omit critical evidence and fail to 
respond to evidence counter to their claims. 
Liberal groups also sponsor studies, but their 
efforts are miniscule. We live in an age of 
deliberate disinformation. 
 
Cultivate Cognitive Empathy  
 
Schwandt recommends that evaluators strive 
to understand other people’s perspectives. I 
strongly agree. Evaluators cannot assume 
their perspective is the only perspective. 
Understanding is not the same as agreeing. If 
the Allies in World War II had understood the 
Nazi perspective better, they could have ended 
the war sooner. If they had agreed with it, they 
would have surrendered. 
Sociologist Mario Small (2019) calls such 
understanding “cognitive empathy.” He 
contends that social researchers are 
quantitatively literate, but not as qualitatively 
literate. Qualitative literacy entails 
understanding other perspectives in depth. 
Cognitive empathy is not feeling empathy. It’s 
not feeling the same as others. Nor is it 
sympathy, feeling sorrow or pity for them. 
Rather it’s the ability to understand people’s 
predicament as they understand it. Their view 
will seem rational within their perspective. We 
can understand why they believe the way they 
do. 
 Small has two admonitions. One is to avoid 
overgeneralizing other views. He calls this 
avoiding “out-group homogeneity bias.” When 
groups are far removed from our perspective, 
their views appear to be less diverse than they 
are. Not all Trump supporters are alike, nor do 
they believe the same things. Tea Party views 
are not those of Wall Street. 
 A second admonition is to be sensitive to 
data used as supporting evidence. For 
example, when journalists report standardized 
test scores, they often explain the results 
based on no empirical evidence whatsoever. 
They may contend scores are low because the 
education system is dysfunctional. But there’s 
no supporting evidence about causes in the 
test scores themselves. Where do such 
explanations come from? From beliefs and 
stereotypes held by those making the claims. 
Politically conservative researchers have 
exploited this propensity by citing poor 
outcomes for social programs and attributing 
them to laziness or lack of intelligence by 
minorities. Since some believe these 
stereotypes, they take the studies to be 
empirical validation of the conclusions without 
any supporting evidence. Small notes liberal 
attempts to explain why Trump supporters 
vote against their economic interests. They 
often contend Trump supporters do so 
because they derive psychological satisfaction. 




In trying to understand my relatives support 
for Trump, I knew that many industrial jobs 
were gone from the area, some overseas. My 
relatives were now retired, employed in service 
jobs in retail, or unemployed.  A few had gone 
to college. Guns and religion were still 
important. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild (2014) 
studied a similar community 600 miles down 
the Mississippi from the St. Louis area, in the 
South rather than Midwest. Tea Party voters 
in Lake Charles, Louisiana, had voted for 
Trump overwhelmingly. 
 In their view life is a long march towards 
the American dream, which lies just over the 
hill. But the line they’re in is stalled. Others 
are cutting in line ahead of them, minorities 
and immigrants, people who used to be behind 
them. That’s not fair, in their view. 
Government agencies are helping these 
people. It’s the government’s fault. Trump 
agrees and blames the government, 
minorities, and immigrants. He derides the 
elites. This is the “deep story” of the Tea Party 
(Hochschild, 2014). It’s also the deep story of 
Fox News, their main source of news. Fairness 
is critical, construed a particular way. 
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 Sociologist Katherine Cramer (2014) 
studied people in small towns and rural areas 
of Wisconsin. Their towns are struggling, 
though people work hard. They believe the 
government is taking money away from them 
and giving it to minorities and immigrants in 
Madison and Milwaukee. Decision-makers 
don’t respect rural people, in their view. These 
resentful voters tipped the state to Trump. A 
total of 80,000 people in Wisconsin, Michigan, 
and Pennsylvania swung enough votes to 
culminate in Trump’s victory. Many had been 
Obama voters. They felt left out of the larger 
society. 
 There are many other deep stories, like 
that of the progressives in Berkeley. In their 
view, Americans built a magnificent public 
square, but marauders invaded the square, 
dismantled it, and stole pieces to build private 
mansions. Massive accumulations of wealth 
threaten democracy itself. That’s not fair, 
either. They supported Bernie Sanders 
(Hochschild, 2014). These are only a few of 
America’s deep stories. 
 If I were evaluating an environmental 
education program in these communities, it 
would help considerably to understand their 
perspectives. Lake Charles has oil refineries 
and toxic industries, like my hometown. Even 
though people die of cancer at high rates, they 
see these industries as vital to their 
livelihoods, and have ways of thinking about 
the problem, including religion. In rural 
Wisconsin my evaluation would be different, 
and different yet again in Berkeley or Oregon. 
 
Focus on Deep Stories and Deep 
Values  
 
Deep stories are the subjective prisms through 
which we view the world, including how we feel 
about it. They are stories that feel right 
emotionally. They are interpretations of events 
and situations that people act on. In the 
Louisiana Tea Party deep story about standing 
in line pursuing the American dream, itself an 
expectation that each generation will be better 
off, the line cutters have been helped by the 
government. Hard working people like them 
made American great, Trump assures them. 
Their rightful honor and dignity can be 
restored, despite elites who write them off as 
“crazy red necks” or “deplorables.” For Tea 
Party people, these are matters of self-worth. 
They will cling to their view tenaciously. 
 Deep values are entwined in deep stories. 
The Louisiana story is built around deep 
values about race, gender, and social class, 
around assumptions of a hierarchy of race, 
gender, and social class. It’s assumed that 
some should be behind others in the natural 
order, a vision derived in part from Louisiana 
history, with its tradition of populist 
movements led by politicians like Huey Long 
(Hochschild, 2016; Judis, 2013, 2018). Within 
this perspective, social status is determined by 
how far a person is from the bottom. Being 
ahead of minorities and immigrants is a 
matter of entitlement. My relatives have 
similar views of race and pollution, but with a 
Midwestern slant. 
 Everyone has a hierarchy of values, with 
some values more central to the belief 
structure. These might be called core values or 
deep values. For most, they include family, 
fairness, and in-group loyalty. For some, they 
also include racism and sexism, deep-seated 
beliefs about who belongs where and deserves 
what. Not all deep values are good or benign. 
The value of fairness plays a central role 
for everyone. Fairness is construed as people 
deserving what they get and not getting what 
they don’t deserve. Tea Party people see line 
cutters as acting unfairly. Progressives see the 
wealthy seizing a large share of national 
wealth as unfair. Both blame elites, with Tea 
Party members also blaming minorities and 
immigrants (Judis, 2018). 
 Everyone has a deep story and deep 
values, and it’s worthwhile for evaluators to 
reflect on theirs. I’ve discussed mine 
elsewhere, which began in childhood as a 
Roosevelt Democrat (House, 2015). Attending 
university made a huge difference in how I 
think about the world. Relatives in my 
hometown who went to college often were not 
Trump supporters. 
 Evaluators might locate their story within 
the population of deep stories. Evaluators 
grow up in a particular region, social class, 
and identify with those in their vocation. 
Having an idea of your position helps 
understand others. An inability or reluctance 
to understand other perspectives is often cited 
in failures of American foreign policy (Judis, 
2018). It can threaten evaluations. 
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I’m not suggesting that all views are 
relative or equally good. Some views are better 
than others because they are more moral and 
soundly based. An informed view includes a 
grasp of other views. A moral view takes into 
account the welfare of others. Even in 
fragmented societies, there may be room for 
agreement based on shared deep values. In 
conducting an evaluation of environmental 
education in Lake Charles or my hometown, I 
would focus on shared deep values. I would be 
unlikely to change their world view, but I 
might find agreement about environmental 
education in some areas, such as how 
pollution affects their children long term. They 
care deeply about their children’s future, and 




Trust is at a premium. Transparency 
engenders trust; lack of transparency 
engenders mistrust. In climates of distrust, 
people imagine bad things are happening. 
Evaluators should be transparent about what 
they’re doing. In a Denver bilingual education 
program beset with years of distrust between 
the school administration and Latino 
community, in my role as federal court 
monitor, I made clear to each group what I was 
doing. I was open to discussion and 
recommendations from them. I shared the 
data we collected and solicited advice as to 
what to collect next to determine whether the 
program was being implemented. Over time 
transparency helped establish trust in the 
evaluation and improved trust among groups. 
Transparency is no panacea, but it helps. 
 
Control for Biases to Enhance 
Fairness and Honesty 
 
Being biased means being influenced by 
things evaluators should not be influenced by. 
The biases might be technical, like sampling 
error and response error, or social, like racial 
and sexual framing, or situational, like conflict 
of interest or misunderstanding other views, or 
psychological, like recency bias or 
inappropriate anchoring. Whatever the biases, 
they can result in distorted findings. 
Stakeholders are justified in seeing biased 
studies as unfair. Taking care to mitigate bias 
is critical in conducting fair evaluations. 
Fortunately, there are careful analyses about 
how to protect against biases (House, 2011; 
Scriven, 1976; Kahneman, 2011; Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
 
Focus on Racial and Sexual 
Framing 
 
When Europeans acquired the military 
technology to dominate the world, they seized 
large tracts of land everywhere to build 
empires. Native peoples were exploited, had 
their land seized, and often were removed or 
exterminated. Sometimes, slaves were 
imported (Beckert, 2014). To justify such 
brutal acts, Europeans developed an ideology 
that these people were savages and deserved 
such treatment. They were inferior, 
uncivilized.  
 This belief system has endured for many 
centuries through racist laws and racial 
framing, embedded in institutions. Racial 
frames are key mechanisms through which 
racist beliefs are perpetuated. They play a 
huge role in American history (DuBois, 1986; 
Feagin, 2011). The white racial frame asserts 
that African Americans are violent, criminal, 
unintelligent, lazy, and oversexed (Feagin, 
2013, p. 101). Whites are superior. Whites are 
immersed in racial framing in childhood and 
often act on it unconsciously (House, 2017).  
 Racial framing is part of System 1 
thinking, in which people interpret events 
instantly and automatically without being 
aware (Kahneman, 2011). The effects are 
pernicious. Something similar happens with 
the stereotyping of females. The nature of 
racial and sexual framing makes social biases 
extremely difficult to change. If the original 
intent was to justify exploitation, what’s the 
continued utility? In the 2016 election, Trump 
joined the power of the wealthy to racial 
framing and right-wing issues to forge a 
winning “plutocratic populist” coalition 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2020). Politics is a key use. 
 Evaluators should look carefully for the 
social biases in programs and evaluations, 
especially in the effects of programs (House, 
2017). They should check their own 
predispositions, those of colleagues, and 
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expect them to check theirs. An 
understanding of minority cultures and the 
majority culture in which racism is 
perpetuated is useful (Hood, Hopson, & 
Frierson, 2005). Some knowledge of race 
history is essential. Perhaps the most frequent 
error of evaluation studies is that the 
conclusions don’t match the data. If readers 
hold stereotypes, they believe the conclusions 
of studies even when the data don’t provide 
support. 
 
Act as Moral Fiduciary  
 
One way to mitigate inequality is for evaluators 
to act as moral fiduciaries. Evaluators might 
assume some moral fiduciary responsibility 
for helping those lower in the social economic 
structure. They might strive to protect the 
interests of those less advantaged. The 
injustices of the larger society are often 
manifested in the evaluation space. Here’s an 
example. 
 In 2009 eleven thousand forensic rape kits 
were discovered in a police warehouse in 
Detroit. The kits had not been processed. For 
the victims, undergoing a rape investigation is 
invasive. The process takes hours and involves 
swabbing samples from every orifice of the 
body. Rape is a crime often committed by 
repeat offenders, and rape kits provide an 
opportunity to identify serial rapists. Yet the 
kits remained unexamined after years. 
 In an examination of police files, Rebecca 
Campbell and her colleagues (Campbell, 
Shaw, & Fehler-Cabral, 2015) discovered that 
the police investigating the crimes repeatedly 
dismissed victim claims of rape on the grounds 
that the women were prostitutes, sexually 
permissive, or did not want their parents to 
know they had sexual partners. In the 
judgment of police officers, the women’s 
claims were not worth pursuing as crimes. 
Such judgments reflected racial framing about 
the presumed character of minority women. 
Police reports often referred to victims in 
highly pejorative terms. 
 Campbell and her colleagues worked 
through the cases with the police until the kits 
were processed, an exhausting exercise, with 
police officials admitting that classifying 
women this way was mistaken. In a sense, the 
researchers appealed to empirical evidence 
and the police sense of fairness. This was a 
difficult study to conduct because it involved 
conflicts of deep stories and deep values. 
During the study, investigators kept in mind 
the welfare of those who had been abused. 
Their welfare was most at stake, not that of the 
police nor those who funded the study. In 
conditions of severe inequality, evaluators 
might give priority to the interests of those less 
able to defend their interests. 
 What is a fiduciary? In the financial 
community, the idea of a fiduciary means that 
the financial agent must act in the best 
interests of the client. As an active investor for 
decades, I can attest that investment 
transactions are riven with conflicts of 
interest. For example, if an investor asks the 
advice of a professional financial advisor, the 
advisor is free to recommend mutual funds 
that enrich the advisor, not the client. 
Advisors often receive fees or a percentage of 
the investment from mutual funds they 
recommend. Clients suffer because this is not 
the best investment for them. This is standard 
practice in finance. 
 Fortunately, there are advisors who swear 
to a higher fiduciary ethical standard. That is, 
they will offer advice that is in the best 
interests of the client. If they fail, they can be 
sued. Reformers have tried to make the 
fiduciary ethic the legal standard for 
investment professionals, but professionals 
have fought vigorously against this, an 
indication of how prevalent not acting in the 
best interests of the client is. 
 Evaluators might act as moral fiduciaries, 
meaning they act in the best interests of those 
less able to defend their interests, rather than 
in the interests of sponsors or other 
stakeholders. Such an ethic doesn’t preclude 
acting in other stakeholder interests as well, 
but it does mean those less advantaged will be 
given priority. In most programs, it’s not 
difficult to determine who’s less advantaged. 
In Detroit, Campbell and her colleagues chose 
to work through case records with police to 
process the kits.  They did not seek to reform 
the police perspective overall, but to change 
their view about specific cases. Hopefully, that 
might affect the overall police perspective, but 
that’s far from certain. Another example of an 
evaluator acting as a moral fiduciary can be 
found in House (2019). 
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 The ethic of moral fiduciary fits a long 
tradition of moral philosophy. John Rawls 
theory of justice as fairness changed the 
dominant utilitarian conception of justice. 
With utilitarianism, you could justify fighting 
wage inflation by inducing a recession that 
would force large numbers of workers out of 
jobs. They would suffer, but the larger society 
benefited—greatest good for the greatest 
number—but without regard for how benefits 
and suffering were distributed within society. 
Rawls said this was unfair. We should attend 
to those less advantaged as a moral duty. 
 Later critics of Rawls said those left out of 
decision processes should also have some 
voice in making decisions that affect them. 
They could not always rely on decision makers 
to make the right decisions without being 
included in discussions. Deliberative 
democratic advocates recommended 
inclusion, discussion, and deliberation of 
stakeholders in decision making and 
evaluation (House & Howe, 1999). Karlsson’s 
(1996) work in Sweden, finding ways to give 
voice to children, was a practical precursor. 
 However, this approach alone doesn’t seem 
potent enough in a society so unequal. 
Evaluators should take stronger actions to 
protect the interests of those less advantaged. 
One way is to act as moral fiduciaries. Instead 
of trying to balance equally the interests of 
different stakeholders, evaluators might give 
priority to those who need help most. Acting 
as a moral fiduciary is more a professional 
ethic than an evaluation approach. It might 
work with most approaches. An evaluator 
could conduct a culturally responsive 
evaluation, an advocacy evaluation, a 
democratic evaluation, a realist evaluation or 
any type of evaluation and still act as a moral 
fiduciary within that approach (Greene, 2015; 
Hood, Hopson, & Frierson, 2005). The 
situation is analogous to financial fiduciaries 
advocating different financial strategies even 




Many key sources of inequality, like tax and 
distribution policies and corporate power 
arrangements, are outside the realm of 
evaluators (Saez & Zucman, 2020; Stiglitz, 
2018). Corporations use their influence with 
legislators to pass laws that increase their 
wealth and power (Gilens, 2012; Mayer, 2016; 
McLean, 2017). The result has been the 
enhanced power of corporations versus 
workers and consumers. In more equal 
societies like the Scandinavian, 70% of 
workers are unionized and act as a counter to 
corporate power. In the U.S., unionized 
workers are less than 10% of the workforce. 
Degree of unionization is one of the highest 
negative correlates with economic inequality 
(Waldman, 2019). 
 Here evaluators might assume the role of 
critic. They might critique evaluative processes 
that engender inequality. For example, a major 
factor contributing directly to inequality is 
rocketing CEO compensation. CEOs appoint 
colleagues, friends, and family to their 
governing boards, controlling the board that 
determines their compensation. The board 
determines CEO pay, and the CEO pays board 
members. As an evaluative process, this is 
ludicrous. CEOs receive such a large portion 
of corporate income that the amount is 
noteworthy in international comparisons 
(Krugman, 2017; Piketty, 2014). 
 Similarly, when Clinton deregulated 
banks, bankers found huge profits in 
subprime mortgages. Bond experts rating the 
quality of mortgages, a key evaluative process, 
were pressured by conflicts of interest, such as 
loss of other banking business. The biased 
ratings contributed directly to the financial 
collapse when highly rated securities failed 
(House, 2013; Tooze, 2018). Hundreds of 
thousands of mortgage holders lost their 
homes, their primary asset. 
 Bankers who perpetrated the scheme 
made large sums of money, even while forging 
mortgage documents. Homeowners lost most 
of what they had. No banker was indicted for 
fraud; inept banks were bailed out. These 
events became issues in the rise of the Tea 
Party, which saw the government acting to 
enrich the wealthy (Judis, 2016; Tooze, 2018). 
Society abounds in evaluative activities badly 
done, places where evaluators might apply 
their expertise. Just as epidemiologists call 
out practices that spread viruses, evaluators 
might call out injurious evaluation practices. 
 Another critical role for evaluators is to 
critique other evaluations. Evaluations should 
not be beyond professional scrutiny. It may be 
that the encroachments of distrust, inequality, 
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and corruption seriously affect evaluations. 
They may become so commercialized that they 
are ineffective as evaluations. It’s the 
obligation of professional evaluators to 
monitor uses and abuses of evaluation, just as 
medical experts might critique the abuse of 
medications. 
 Yet another role might be to investigate the 
effects of inequality and the mechanisms 
through which inequality works. Negative 
effects include lower life expectancies, 
increasing health and social problems, higher 
homicide rates, and polarized politics. Relative 
socio-economic status affects people’s health, 
politics, conceptions of self, and how they 
think (Payne, 2017). Lower status often leads 
to riskier behavior and short-term thinking. A 
child in a more unequal state like Texas will 
engage in more risky behavior than one in 
Iowa, states with similar mean incomes. A 
child in Iowa will have better health. Higher 
status often leads to better opportunities, 
superior self-image, a sense of entitlement, 
and sometimes a disregard of others (Payne, 
2017). The connections between inequality, 
programs and effects should be explored. 
There are good measures of inequality, and 
evaluators could develop others suited to 
particular situations or programs. 
 A simple idea is to include the context of 
programs in evaluation reports. In a study of 
those evicted from their homes, Desmond 
(2016) documented the pernicious effects of 
eviction on parents and children and 
connected them to the rental and eviction 
policies and laws that facilitated such 
outcomes. 
 Status differentials operate within small 
groups, programs, and evaluations. 
Evaluators might be alert for the inequality 
and its effects. For example, it’s difficult to 
collect information from lower status 
individuals, partly because they don’t trust 
authority figures and believe their views don’t 
matter. Evaluators collect data mostly from 
those in higher status tiers. Differences in 
status result in information lacunas among 
the tiers of the program and evaluation. Those 
at one level misjudge what those at other levels 




Do the Right Thing 
 
Can evaluators do these things? Evaluators 
can implement some of the practices I’ve 
suggested within most evaluation approaches. 
These practices could enhance the potency of 
evaluations.  My idea of making changes in 
evaluation overall has been to figure out the 
best way to evaluate and convince others. 
Otherwise, if we always follow the status quo, 
there would be no improvement, no qualitative 
studies, no social justice studies, no meta-
analyses, no realist studies. Of course, such 
changes are for the professional community as 
a whole to consider. 
 Sometimes people know the right thing to 
do, but don’t do it. The right thing is usually 
the moral thing to do, to take other people’s 
welfare into serious consideration. Some may 
be impeded by fear of loss to career, 
reputation, or material interest. They fear it 
might cost them something. Professionals 
center their lives around their careers. 
Enhancing and defending careers is a natural 
instinct. 
 But enhancing careers is not always the 
right thing to do. The notorious lobbyist, Jack 
Abramoff, who served time in prison, said his 
best line to persuade Congressional aides to 
do what he wanted was, “When you are done 
working for the Congressman, you should 
come work for me at my firm….” “With that,” 
Abramoff said, ‘I would own him….” (Abramoff, 
2011, p. 95; Lessig, 2018.). The allure of a 
career in a K Street lobbying firm induced 
many to commit illegal acts. 
 We should consider careers in the context 
of benefits to society. We don’t need more 
professionals who sell their services to the 
highest bidder. That increases distrust and 
inequality, just as we don’t need investment 
advisors who put their interests above those of 
clients. A higher moral standard is required. 
 In the long run, you never know how 
future events might turn out. Those of us who 
were young in 1960 never imagined that 
American society would be the way it is now. 
That’s the point. The best thing to do in 
uncertain times is to make moral choices. I’m 
not suggesting that such behavior will reform 
the entire society. But a part of it will be better. 
Shakespeare’s Marc Antony was only half right 
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when he said the evil that men do lives after 
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